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y
“The ‘Digression’ in Plato’s Theaetetus: 
A New Interpretation”
David Levy 
University of Rochester
I take it that one of Plato’s goals in the Theaetetus is to point out exactly what is 
wrong with the following Protagorean doctrine:
Man is the measure of all things—alike of the being of things that 
are and of the not-being of things that are not (152A).1
Indeed, this task occupies the largest single section of the dialogue; the discussion of the 
Protagorean doctrine takes up the better part of 27 Stephanus pages, beginning at 152A, 
and continuing through 179D. That this is so should initially surprise the reader of the 
dialogues. Hadn’t Protagoras already received his due in the dialogue named for him? 
And why should Protagoras, or at least his teachings, play so central a role in a dialogue 
concerned with finding a definition of knowledge, when Protagoras himself, a sophist, 
was primarily concerned with teaching his students to be better at the game of politics?
In this paper, I propose that answers to these questions are found in Socrates’ 
“digression” at Tht. 172D-177C. As will become clear, the digression primarily takes up 
political themes, which again should leave the reader wondering about its placement in a 
dialogue concerning epistemology. It is my contention that Plato believed these themes 
to be intimately bound up with Protagoras’s doctrine, and that his comments on these 
themes are an integral part of his critique of that doctrine.2 In arguing for my position, I 
do not intend to take up the question of whether or not Plato succeeds in refitting die 
Protagorean doctrine. Rather, I believe that the literature which focuses on that question 
is deficient for its failure to pay sufficient attention to the digression. After briefly 
reviewing this literature, I will offer an interpretation of the digression which makes clear 
its relationship to Plato’s overall critique of Protagoras.
Before turning to the literature, I will provide a brief synopsis of what happens in 
the digression. At 172D3 Socrates begins to contrast those who spend their time in law 
courts and those who engage in philosophical study. Lawyers, politicians, and orators do 
not have the leisure to engage in truly free inquiry; instead, they conduct their 
examinations under pressure from the water clock. Moreover, they are not free to follow 
the path of the argument wherever it takes them, but must stay close to the heart of the 
matter at hand. Philosophers, on the other hand, conduct their inquiries without concern
1A11 references to the Theaetetus are to F. M. Comford’s 1935 translation. Stephanus page references to 
this dialogue w ill appear in the body o f the text The question o f precisely what form this critique o f 
Protagoras takes is an interesting one. Indeed, one o f the purposes o f this paper is to try to get clear on this 
very issue. As w ill become clear, for many commentators the central question is whether or not Plato 
succeeds in  refitting Protagoras through strict, logical argument. For a commentator who believes that this 
question is misguided, see Edward N. Lee, ‘“Hoist with His Own Petard’ : Ironic and Comic Elements in  
Plato’s Critique o f Protagoras {Tht. 161-171)”, in Exegesis and Argument (ed. E. N. Lee, A. P. D. 
Mourelatos, R. M. Rorty), Phronesis Suppl. Vol. 1,1973: Van Gorcum & Co. (A ssen, The Netherlands), 
225-261. See esp. 256, n. 41.
2The precise placement o f the digression, I believe, should indicate that Plato himself thought it  an integral 
part o f his arguments against Protagoras. After all, it is “sandwiched” between the so-called peritrope and 
the final arguments levied against Protagoras. As I w ill make clear in what follow s, I think that this 
placement has too often been misunderstood, leading to the relative lack o f serious discussion o f the 
digression within the secondary literature.
2for time. This absolute freedom of inquiry allows them to take up whatever topic arises. 
Whereas the orator has a great need to keep up with the gossip of the marketplace- 
knowledge of personal scandals can serve one well in a debate judged by the rabble, after 
all—the philosopher does not even know the way to the marketplace. Of course, this 
makes the philosopher appear foolish if ever he enters a law court. However, the orator 
appears equally foolish if he is ever required to consider the nature of justice or kingship, 
rather than particular matters of one person wronging another.
The digression comes to an end with Socrates discussing the right motive for 
being virtuous and avoiding vice. Contrary to what is generally believed, the right 
motive is not to have the appearance of a good person. Instead, the right reason for 
taking the righteous path is that, in doing so, one is following the pattern of divine 
happiness. All those who fail to follow this path live in an eternal state of godless 
misery; such misery is brought about by the very lives they lead, where they find 
themselves in constant association with others like them. If only they would agree to 
submit their beliefs to an impartial examination, they would discover that they cannot 
give a satisfactory account of them, and would become as silent as children.
A common mistake made in the literature on the Theaetetus is to ignore entirely 
the presence of the digression.3 Kenneth M. Sayre, in Plato’s Analytic Method,4 makes 
this mistake. Sayre includes an 80-page chapter on the Theaetetus in which the 
digression is not mentioned at all. Indeed, in the entire book, only one passage from the 
digression is cited, and that appears in Sayre’s chapter on the Sophist.5 This might be 
understandable if Sayre were not focusing on the part of the dialogue which deals with 
the critique of Protagoras.6 Yet, Sayre does take up this part of the dialogue. Sayre 
works very hard to get clear on the precise form of the argument which immediately 
precedes the digression, the peritrope, and argues that this argument is unsound.7 
Moreover, Sayre offers some remarks on the argument which immediately follows the 
digression.8 Highly conspicuous by its absence is any mention of the digression. We 
should expect Sayre to provide some justification for ignoring this part of the dialogue, 
yet none is forthcoming. As I will argue later, understanding the digression is essential to 
understanding what Plato is doing with the Protagorean doctrine. As such, Sayre’s 
discussion of this part of the dialogue is limited by its failure to take note of the 
digression.
Another common approach to the digression is to acknowledge its presence, but 
set it aside as a relatively insignificant rhetorical device. This is the tactic Robin 
Waterfield employs in the critical essay attached to his translation of the dialogue.9
3There are even some translators who leave this section o f the dialogue out entirely. This is the case with 
Gwynneth Matthews’ translation in Plato ’s Epistemology, 1972: Faber & Faber (London).
4Kenneth M. Sayre, Plato ’s Analytic Method, 1969: University o f Chicago Press (Chicago).
5Ibid., p. 179, n. 40 recalls the digression’s characterization o f the philosopher as a “free man” (Tht. 172D).
6This is the case with Nicholas P. W hite’s Plato on Knowledge and. Reality, 1976: Hackett Publishing 
Company (Indianapolis). Although W hite’s book contains a 40-page chapter on the Theaetetus, he is 
mostly concerned with the dialogue’s treatment o f the problem o f false belief.
7Ibid„ pp. 87-91.
sIbid., pp. 91-92. This argument turns on the expert’s ability to predict the future.
9Robin W aterfield (trans.), Theaetetus, 1987: Penguin Books (New York). See also Gilbert Ryle, Plato’s 
Progress, 1966: Cambridge (Cambridge University Press). Ryle describes the digression as “long and 
philosophically quite pointless” (p. 158).
3Plato pauses from hard argument against Protagoras and inserts a 
few pages of glorious, impassioned writing contrasting the 
mentality of philosophers with that of the worldly-wise...[A]s a 
rhetorical passage, it needs little commentary: its merits are on the 
surface.10
Later, Wateifield adds that the digression “stands on its own.”11 What could Waterfield, 
and others like him, mean by this? We might begin to answer this question by focusing 
on Waterfield’s claim that Plato “pauses” here from strict argument.12
The section immediately preceding the digression is one of the harder sections of 
the dialogue to follow. Indeed, a considerable body of literature concerns the form of the 
argument from 170A to 172C is. The success or failure of this argument turns heavily on 
figuring out what form it takes; an invalid deductive argument does not prove anything. 
Plato himself seems to have recognized that some defect has infected his argument; so 
Socrates notes that, if he could, Protagoras “would expose me thoroughly for talking such 
nonsense and you [Theodoras] for agreeing to it” (171D). With this comment in mind, all 
the commentators who focus on finding the flaw, if any, in the argument preceding the 
digression are certainly justified in their work. Moreover, when Socrates refers to the 
immediately following pages as a “digression” (177C), it does seem natural to read the 
intervening pages as a hiatus from strict argument.
However, the attitude implicit in Waterfield’s comments seems to be that the 
digression is nothing more than Socrates’ way of entertaining the reader with a song and 
dance. After being ran ragged by the difficult arguments of the preceding passages, the 
story seems to go, the reader needs a break in order to catch her breath.13 And so 
Socrates presents his caricatures of the orator and the philosopher. The commentators 
who adopt this attitude to the digression fail to recognize that, behind Socrates’ 
caricatures, serious philosophical work is being done. Not only is Plato directing his 
mouthpiece to comment on the characteristics representative of the orator and the 
philosopher and of the situations in which each finds himself, but in doing so, he is 
continuing his critique of the Protagorean position. The position for which I wish to 
argue takes Socrates’ description of the passage from 172D-177C as a “digression” as 
ironic. That is, contrary to the attitude which best explains the position taken by 
commentators such as Waterfield, I propose that we take the digression very seriously, 
and look for its merits well beneath the surface.
10Ibid., p. 177. Emphasis added.
n Ibid., p. 178.
12Although R ands M. Comford does not make this exact mistake, it is worth noting here one remark from  
his treatment o f the Theaetetus (Plato’s Theory o f Knowledge, 1957: New York (The library o f liberal 
Arts)). Comford notes that at the end o f the digression, “ [t]he argument is now resumed” (p. 89). This 
places Comford squarely in the group of commentators who, like W aterfield, believe that Plato uses the 
digression to take a break from strict argument.
13There is another way o f interpreting the attitude which leads to ignoring the digression. Rather than 
providing an opportunity for the reader to catch her breath, perhaps the digression is seen as Plato’s way of 
signaling that a lot o f work needs to be done in order to understand the preceding arguments. Perhaps die 
digression is placed at this point in the dialogue as Plato’s way o f saying to the reader, “If you want to try 
to figure out that last argument (the peritrope), go right ahead. The dramatic action o f the dialogue w ill 
continue, but you w ill not be m issing any important philosophical points.” Again, I think that this way of 
reading the digression is equally flawed for failing to recognize the serious work which Socrates is doing in 
this passage.
4A commentator who has realized the importance of the digression is Edward N. 
Lee, who acknowledges that the digression “helps shed important light upon the purposes 
and central ironies in the critique he [Plato] levels at Protagoras.”14 Moreover, Lee 
indicates that he believes that any reading of the dialogue which fails to take into 
consideration the points made in the digression is, at most, incomplete. This is a crucial 
point about which I agree with Lee.15 However, the only use Lee makes of the digression 
is to demonstrate how it relates to Plato’s earlier critique of Protagoras. To be fair, Lee 
acknowledges die limited focus of his interpretation. He writes: “The present analysis 
directs itself only to the ironic structure of..,161B-171D, but it is not at all my thesis that 
these pages form any simply detachable unit or that they are discontinuous with the 
remainder of the critique.”16 So Lee is to be given credit for not saying that the only 
value the digression has is as an instrument for understanding the preceding arguments 
against Protagoras. Still, it must be admitted that Lee does not do any work toward 
establishing a reading of the digression in which it stands on its own, in which its value is 
intrinsic rather than instrumental. Again, the absence of this work is excusable, given 
Lee’s project. But it is this very absence which I wish to eliminate, in order to provide a 
more complete account of the digression and its role in the critique of Protagoras. And so 
I now turn to my own interpretation of the digression.
The digression is immediately preceded by Socrates speaking about extreme 
conventionalism with respect to “right and wrong and in matters of religion” (172B). 
People who adopt this sort of position affirm that justice and injustice, holiness and 
unholiness, have no natural independent existence; rather, all that exists with respect to 
these things is the common opinion, which becomes true as soon as it is enacted and 
remains true as long as that opinion does not change. Given that much of the digression 
concerns individuals who find themselves in places where decisions about such matters 
are made, we should pause for a moment and try to figure out the connection Plato sees 
between this topic and the overall epistemological critique of Protagoras. I believe Plato
14Lee, op. cit., p. 225.
I5I have mentioned this conviction o f mine several times already, and so I think it is tim e for m e to say a 
little more about it. It is not my b elief that a reading o f the dialogue which fails to account for the 
digression is, ipso facto, wrong. I do think that it is a legitim ate undertaking to try to figure out the logical 
form o f the arguments Hato offers, determine if  they are valid, and, if  so, how credible the premises are.
To this extent, the question o f whether or not Hato succeeds in refuting die Protagorean doctrine is an 
important one. (Here is one o f the points where I disagree with Lee ; see n. 1, above.) However, I think the 
mistake such com m entators make is believing that this is the only way to read the dialogue, and the only 
question to ask. On the assumption that Plato recognized that not everyone would be convinced by the 
peritrope, coupled with Plato’s desire to point out all the ways in which the Protagorean goes wrong, we 
should expect Plato to offer various reasons not to accept the Protagorean doctrine; those who would be 
able to follow  the logic o f the peritrope, or at least get excited enough by it to try to figure out i f  it succeeds 
or not, were not all the members o f Plato’s audience. Moreover, even among those who could follow  the 
argument there m ight be those who would resist the conclusion, viz., those disposed to accept the 
Protagorean position. As I w ill argue later. Hato believed, with good reason, that the m ost important 
practical and moral matters stand or fall with the rejection or acceptance of the Protagorean doctrine. For 
this reason, it was extremely important to Plato to persuade as many people as he could not to be 
Protagoreans. H ato was not w illing to let those people who could not follow  the logic o f the peritrope 
becom e Protagoreans just because they could not follow  that argument. Nor was he w illing to let those 
generally suspicious o f that sort o f argument become (or remain) Protagoreans. As such, it is equally 
legitim ate to identify the reasons Plato offered to those people, and to evaluate them on their own terms. (I 
guess the moral I w ish to draw from this is that the goals of, on the one hand, refuting Protagoras and, on 
the other hand, convincing people not to be Protagoreans even if  they do not see that the position is self- 
refuting are not mutually exclusive.)
16Lee, op. cit., p. 255.
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recognizes at least two such connections. In the first place, the sort of conventionalism 
mentioned at 172B is, as Comford puts it, “the extreme consequence of making man the 
measure of all things”.17 Although Plato seems to have recognized that this position goes 
beyond what the historical Protagoras held,18 it is not surprising that he would include it 
here. In the process of examining a philosophical position, we often want to know what 
consequences result from a consistent application of the principles constitutive of that 
position. At times, such an investigation reveals consequences we reasonably find 
unacceptable. Although this does not give us reason to reject the position under 
investigation, it indicates that there is a need to appeal to some other principle in order to 
block those consequences.19 In the process of compiling all the reasons to reject the 
Protagorean doctrine, then, this move is methodologically sound.20
The second connection I believe Plato draws is more peculiar to Plato’s meta­
philosophy. For Plato in particular, there is good reason to discuss matters political and 
ethical while doing epistemology. For Plato, the answer to the question, “What is 
knowledge?” has significant ethical ramifications.21 It is inseparably connected to the 
answers to the questions, “What is virtue? ”, “Can virtue be taught?”, and “How ought I to 
live my life?” To help see this, I think we need to remind ourselves that virtue is 
identified with knowledge at Meno 88C-D and at Protagoras 361B-C. Further, we 
should recall the triple role assigned to the Good-Itself in Republic VI and VII.22 Not 
only is the Good-Itself the pinnacle of Plato’s ethics, but it is also the capstone of his 
ontology and the supreme object of knowledge.23 With this background in mind, it 
becomes somewhat easier to see why we are led into a discussion of ethics and politics in 
the middle of the investigation into the nature of knowledge in the Theaetetus. If 
Protagoras’s relativistic doctrine—even in its most extreme form—is the correct account of
17Comford, op. cit., p. 83.
18At 172C, he calls the adherents to this position “those who do not argue altogether as Protagoras does”. 
That this position goes beyond what the historical Protagoras maintained can be seen from what Socrates 
says at both 166C-167D andl71E-172A. In both cases, Socrates attributes to Protagoras—in  the earlier 
passage, going so far to put the words in Protagoras’s mouth, were he able to com e back from the dead and 
defend him self—the position that, though all decisions in these sorts o f matters are true, som e are better than 
others. Extreme conventionalists o f the sort described at 172B reject this final claim; for than, there is no 
basis for making any such judgment.
19 Hato often uses this strategy. For just one example, see the Mnaidos objection to C allicles’ hedonism at 
Gorg. 494B-495C.
20 At the end o f the paper, I w ill return to this issue and connect the points against Protagoras made here 
with those made elsewhere in the overall critique.
21I am tempted to say something quite a bit stronger here. It almost seems as if, for H ato, the question, 
“What is knowledge?” is itself an ethical question. Nowadays, it is commonplace to (logically) distinguish 
between questions m etaphysical, epistem ological, and ethical. It is not clear to what extent Plato 
recognized these distinctions. However, I do not think anything o f any great weight turns on this in the 
present discussion.
22See especially 505A -B, 509B-C, and 516B-517C.
recognize that these remarks w ill be contested by many interpreters o f Plato. Not only are they a 
controversial reading o f Books VI-VII o f the Republic, but they also ignore substantive questions 
concerning the evolution o f Plato’s thought between the writing o f the Republic and that o f the Theaetetus. 
Whether or not m y reading is correct, I remain convinced that Plato held onto his systematic approach until 
at least this stage in  his career.
6knowledge, disaster results in matters of ethics and politics. This, I believe, is the point 
of placing the digression in the middle of the critique of Protagoras.
Early in the digression, Plato has Socrates give a characterization of the orator, 
and of the situations in which the orator is most likely to be found.
The orator is always talking against time, hurried on by the clock; 
there is no space to enlarge upon any subject he chooses, but the 
adversary stands over him ready to recite a schedule of the points 
to which he must confine himself. He is a slave disputing about a 
fellow slave before a master sitting in judgment with some definite 
plea in his hand, and the issue is never indifferent, but his personal 
concerns are always at stake, sometimes even his life. (172E)
From this description, it is clear that Plato is talking about the law courts. The Theaetetus 
is filled with images of legal proceedings, from the earliest pages—at 145C Socrates tells 
Theaetetus that “we don’t want [Theodoras] to have to give evidence on oath” 
concerning the youth’s character—to this middle section of the dialogue, to the famous 
“jury” passage from 201A-C--the point of which is to show that the methods of inquiry 
demanded by such proceedings are incompatible with knowledge acquisition—to the final 
image of the dialogue at 210D, where we see Socrates going to meet the charges which 
have been brought against him. In all of these images the tone is decidedly negative. I 
would suggest that this is so in every case for two reasons.24 First of all, when charges 
were brought against an individual, both the charged individual and the person bringing 
the charges would have to make a written statement which strictly limited the range of 
points admissible during the legal procedure. Moreover, during the trial each side would 
have a fixed amount of time to make his points. In this way, the orator was not “free” to 
explore other issues, nor was he able to investigate completely issues from within the 
permitted range. Given these limitations, and given the interests at stake (“personal 
concerns..., sometimes even his life”) it would not be unusual for the truth of the matter 
to be lost in the shuffle. Instead, the primary concern became convincing the jury to 
believe your side of the story over your adversary’s. To succeed at this task, it was 
extremely useful to have at one’s disposal the skills of rhetoric. That this is so may be 
reinforced by Plato’s second point against the legal system.
In the law court, once each side has had a chance to make its case, the matter is 
turned over to the jury. Each member of the jury is given a vote, and what the jury 
decides is the ruling on the matter. In other words, the jury is treated as the measure of 
the matter. Regardless of what really happened in the case at hand, regardless of the 
actual guilt or innocence of the accused, as far as society is concerned, what the jury says 
is the truth. Given this situation, Plato believes it is absolutely essential to be skilled in 
rhetoric in this setting. With the jury as the measure, there is no necessary connection 
between the facts of the case and the verdict. What is more important is the ability to 
manipulate the jury members so that they accept your side of the story. In this way, Plato 
sees the entire jury system as a product of a Protagorean way of thinking.
Plato is highly critical of this situation. He describes the man able to succeed in 
this environment as
narrow and crooked. An apprenticeship in slavery has dwarfed 
and twisted his growth and robbed him of his free spirit, driving 
him into devious ways, threatening him with fears and dangers
24In what follow s I w ill lim it my discussion to proceedings within the law courts. However, I take it that 
most o f my points are equally applicable to the sort o f debates which took place in  the Assem bly or even 
the marketplace.
7which the tenderness of youth could not face with truth and 
honesty; so, turning from the first to lies and the requital of wrong 
with wrong, warped and stunted, he passes from youth to manhood 
with no soundness in him... (173A-B)
Plato’s first criticism of the extreme Protagorean in the digression, while not explicitly 
directed at the man-measure doctrine, does have as its ultimate target that doctrine. Plato 
is critical of the legal system and its institutions for “warping” the minds of its 
participants. Given that juries were often comprised of hundreds of people, and that 
debates in the popular assembly were often attended by thousands of citizens, these 
participants would have included virtually everyone with Athenian citizenship. What 
Plato sees, then, is a connection between the Athenian legal system and the declining 
health of the average Athenian’s soul. Rather than allowing its citizens to develop fully, 
it leaves them in a grotesquely deformed state. They do not know how to conduct an 
inquiry the goal of which is truth; they do not know how to give free range to their 
thoughts and take the kind of perspective needed to see the connections among a large 
variety of concepts. Instead, the sole purpose of conducting an inquiry is to prevail over 
your opponent, and to win public honors for having done so. Given the connection we 
have seen between these institutions and the man-measure doctrine, I will call this 
warped state of the soul the Protagorean deformation.25
To see further why Plato would be concerned about this, it will be useful to recall 
one of the most famous parts of Socrates’ defense. It is especially appropriate to do so in 
this context, given the overall dramatic setting of the Theaetetus. Toward the close of his 
defense, Socrates says:
“...I shall not cease to practice philosophy, to exhort you and in my 
usual way to point out to any one of you whom I happen to meet:
Good Sir, you are an Athenian, a citizen of the greatest city with 
the greatest reputation for both wisdom and power; are you not 
ashamed of your eagerness to possess as much wealth, reputation, 
and honors as possible, while you do not care for nor give thought 
to wisdom or truth, or the best possible state of your soul?”...I shall 
reproach him because he attaches little importance to the most 
important things and greater importance to inferior things...I go 
around doing nothing but persuading both young and old among 
you not to care for your body or your wealth in preference to or as 
strongly as for the best possible state of your soul, as I say to you: 
“Wealth does not bring about excellence, but excellence brings 
about wealth and all other public and private blessings for men.”26
For Plato, as for Socrates, the most important matters have to do with the state of one’s 
soul. The state of one’s soul is not determined by the acquisition of external goods; an
25 There are many interesting connections between this line o f thought and several points made in  the 
Gorgias. Although there is not space to explore these fully, I w ill briefly mention one. In the closing pages 
of the Gorgias, Socrates describes for Callicles the process of judging souls before they enter either the 
Isles o f the Blessed or Tartarus. A t 525A Socrates characterizes those souls bound for Tartarus as “deeply 
scarred,... twisted by lies and impostures, crooked because [they have] received no nourishment from truth” 
(Helmbold translation). In the overall context o f the discussion with Callicles, it is clear that the sort o f 
individual being described is one who lives a life of impunity and who uses rhetoric solely for the purpose 
o f flattering others, “whether the few or the many” ( Gorg. 527C).
2eApol. 29D-30B. Grube translation.
8individual who amasses great wealth and receives many public honors does not 
necessarily have a healthy soul. Just as Socrates found the level of psychic sickness high 
among the Athenians who focused their energy on possessing wealth and power instead 
of wisdom and truth, so Plato found the souls of the Athenians to be deformed.
Moreover, Plato criticizes those who capitalize on the needs brought about by this 
system and its institutions. To return to the passage from 173A-B quoted above, we 
should remind ourselves that Plato relates the deformation of the average Athenian’s soul 
to some sort of “apprenticeship”. By implication, then, there is a second individual—or 
group of individuals—being discussed. This individual, whoever it is, is responsible for 
the training of those Athenians who were able to succeed in the law courts through their 
use of rhetoric. We have already seen the relationship between institutions such as the 
law courts and Protagoras’s measure doctrine. Although Protagoras claimed to be a 
teacher of virtue or excellence, it is clear that he also taught rhetoric.27 There is a strong 
connection between his relativism and rhetoric. If all impressions are true for the 
individual who has them, then whenever there is an issue to be settled by the jury, there 
are no independent “facts” to which one can appeal. If there are no such facts, then the 
only way to get the members of the jury to adopt the position one is advocating is to 
make it seem the most salutary of their options. The ways to do that, of course, are the 
area of expertise of the teacher of rhetoric.
At this point in the digression, at Theodorus’s insistence,28 Socrates offers a 
contrasting picture of the philosopher. In highly exaggerated terms, Socrates paints a 
picture of an entirely other-worldly ascetic. The true philosopher never finds himself in 
any place where people are wont to gossip. He has no concerns with the affairs of his 
neighbors. Rather than concerning himself with matters of this world, he turns his 
attention to the heavens, and tries to discover the true nature of everything.29 Of course 
this characterization is exaggerated.30 However, what emerges from it is a picture of the 
philosopher completely contrary to the product of the Protagorean deformation. We are 
told that the true philosophers “never hear a decree read out or look at the text of a law” 
(173D). The philosopher has no need to pay attention to such mundane things. After all, 
it is the philosopher who recognizes that there is a universal law which is the true 
governor of man’s actions. What one man, or one assembly of men, decrees to be the law 
does not thereby gain any special power over the actions of humankind. In this way, the 
true philosopher recognizes that man is certainly not the measure of all things.
In contrast, those who offer such decrees, and those who stop to listen to them and 
to read the text of the conventional law, are the same people who worry about the gossip 
of the marketplace and who judge their neighbors on the basis of their ancestry.
Although these people may not recognize the Protagorean foundation of their actions, 
their actions are certainly grounded in some sort of Protagorean principle. They believe 
that the decree of the assembly becomes the law to which they are beholden simply 
because men have said so. They believe the tales told in the marketplace and at social
27See, for example, DK 80B6b.
28By quite a com ic turn, Plato has Theodoras here say: “[W ]e are not the servants o f the argument, which 
must stand and wait for the moment when we choose to pursue this or that topic to a conclusion” (173C). 
If my reading o f the digression as itself part o f the argument against Protagoras is correct, we must take 
Theodoras’s remark about the argument being put on hold as ironic. For those who hesitate to attribute to 
Theodoras the sophistication needed to recognize this, I offer that Plato has allow ed Theodoras to 
unwittingly make this ironic comment.
29Quite literally in Thales’ case, as we are reminded at 174A.
30One is here reminded of the “common” perception o f the philosopher as “useless” at Rep. 487D , or o f 
Aristophanes’ portrait o f Socrates’ “school” in Clouds.
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dinners, and alter their relations accordingly.31 To use Plato’s metaphor, they never seek 
“the true nature of everything as a whole,” choosing instead to sink “to what lies close at 
hand” (174A).
As Plato sees it, these are also the people who dominate Athenian society. 
Athenian democracy and law courts encourage and embrace Protagorean relativism, 
whether they realize it or not. This situation spells trouble for the philosopher, whose 
complete lack of concern for this world plays to his disadvantage when he is thrust into a 
situation in which “he is forced to talk about what lies at his feet or is before his eyes” 
(174C). In particular, if the philosopher finds himself in a law court, facing charges 
brought against him by one of the rabble, he will have no hope of convincing a jury of his 
innocence. For Plato, exposing this situation for what it is and trying to initiate some 
push for reform is a matter of the greatest urgency.
I think we are now in a position to see what the argument of the digression is. 
After presenting it in its most general form, I will make some brief remarks about it 
before returning to the rest of the digression, and to the question of the digression’s 
placement in the overall critique of Protagoras’s doctrine.
Pr. 1 — If the acceptance of a philosophical position produces bad 
consequences in important matters, then it ought to be 
rejected.
Pr. 2—Acceptance of the Protagorean measure doctrine
produces bad consequences in important political and
______ethical matters.
C- - The Protagorean measure doctrine ought to be rejected.
We have already reviewed a bit of Plato’s support for the second premise. There are at 
least two areas in which acceptance of the Protagorean doctrine produces bad 
consequences: it warps the “spirit” of the average Athenian, and it leads to injustice in 
the legal system.
That Plato would endorse the first premise of this argument I take to be generally 
clear. I have already provided some reason for believing this. For Plato, there are very 
close connections among epistemological, ontological, and ethical issues; this seems to 
be one of the key ideas expressed by placing the Good-Itself at the pinnacle of his 
ontology. What is needed, however, is some reason to think that this premise is at work 
in the digression. At first glance, there is not any. Still, we have already seen that we can 
be grossly misled about the digression if we rely on initial appearances. With that in 
mind, I propose that we can find the first premise within the text of the digression.
As I mentioned earlier in my brief synopsis of the digression, the final movement 
of the passage concerns the right motive for being righteous. Rather quickly, Socrates 
rejects the common idea that the right motive is to “seem innocent and good” (176B). In 
the absence of genuine goodness, the mere semblance of goodness is insufficient when it 
comes to what is really important.32 While it is true that the semblance of goodness is 
often enough to avoid penalties in this life,33 the absence of righteousness in the soul 
brings a penalty which “cannot be escaped” (176E). This penalty is an earth-bound life
31Qnce again w e are reminded o f Socrates’ trial at this point. The effects o f gossip are what Socrates 
labels the “old charges” stApol. 18B-E. Socrates also recognizes that these effects w ill be the hardest to 
overcome.
32Note that this common idea, which equates seeming good with being good, itself bears a close 
connection to Protagoras’s measure doctrine.
33These are the “stripes and death” referred to at 176D/E.
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of “godless misery,” devoid of all hope of entering the realm of divine happiness (176E- 
177A). For our purposes, what is crucial to note about this is that it is an argument for 
rejecting the common conception. The reasons for rejecting it point out that those who 
accept the common conception will be eternally miserable. More generally, acceptance 
of tins conception produces bad consequences in an important matter. If this is an 
accurate reading of the closing of the digression, then, for the argument to have any 
merit, Plato must be employing our Pr. 1.
Given the dramatic setting of the dialogue, Plato forces us to confront the reality 
of the situation. The general acceptance of the Protagorean doctrine leads to the greatest 
injustices, not the least of which is Socrates’ execution. Plato, then, is trying to compile 
all the reasons not to accept the Protagorean measure doctrine. He has already tried to 
demonstrate that the Protagorean position is self-refuting. On the assumption that this 
argument would not persuade everyone not to accept that position, Plato continued to 
offer arguments against accepting it. By turning his attention to the extreme 
conventionalism of the digression, and the unacceptable consequences that result from 
accepting it, he is pointing out the need modify the position by appealing to other 
principles.34 Once the digression is complete, Socrates and Theodoras return to a more 
moderate version of the Protagorean position in which qualitative differences among 
judgments are spelled out in terms of experts and their ability to make reliable predictions 
about the future. Socrates then proceeds to argue that the principle invoked here is not 
consistent with the measure doctrine.35 If these are the only, or the most appealing, ways 
to spell out the Protagorean position, then Plato has succeeded in eliminating the 
Protagorean position from the table of viable alternatives, and in setting the stage for 
discovering the true nature of knowledge, virtue, and justice. Finally, Plato is not guilty 
of employing the same tactics for which he criticizes Protagoras, for the brand of 
persuasion he employs is “beautiful, a genuine attempt to make the souls of [his] fellows 
as excellent as may be. ”36’37
34Andrew Barker, in ‘T he Digression in the Theaetetus”, Journal o f the History o f Philosophy 14 (1976), 
457-462, refers to the argument o f the digression as “popular” as opposed to “philosophical” (p. 462). 
Barker considers the argument to be focused on the different sorts of subjects discussed by the orator and 
the philosopher : whereas the orator discusses particular local conventions only, the philosopher discusses 
universal moral natures. Barker then criticizes the argument for the “common-sense assumption” on which 
it rests (p. 462). I have two points to make, one against Barker’s interpretation, and one in favor of my 
own. Against Barker it can be noted that he fails to draw the connection between the man-measure doctrine 
and the institutions which give it license. In favor o f my interpretation, it can be noted that it does not rest 
on any “common-sense assumption”.
35 See 177C5-179D1 for this argument.
36Gorg. 503A.
37An earlier version o f this paper was read at the 21st Annual Graduate Philosophy Conference sponsored 
by the Graduate Philosophy Organization o f the University o f Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Matt 
Johnston provided comments. I would like to thank die Philosophy Department o f the University of 
Rochester for supporting m y research on this project Eva Cadavid, Catherine McKeen, David Merli, and 
Greg W heeler forced me to work through several o f the broader issues involved in this paper, especially the 
way in which I see the digression fitting within Plato’s overall critique o f Protagoras. Finally, Deborah 
Modrak and Randall Curren have provided many valuable insights and criticisms as my thoughts on this 
issue have developed.
